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I. INTRODUCTION 
Of the myriad crises facing the world, none has more potential 
for global damage and long-term impacts as climate change. From 
coastal land loss in the Gulf of Mexico, to rising waters in the 
Netherlands, to drowning Pacific Islands, the impacts of a warming 
climate and rising seas are obvious. Although skeptics remain, 
most nations recognize the problems posed by a warming world, 
and many are actively working to address them. Mitigation 
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measures aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions are being 
pursued, and efforts to adapt to changing conditions are debated 
and sometimes implemented. Few countries are more concerned 
with making progress in this regard than countries with low-lying 
coastal regions and island nations, which are directly threatened by 
a warming climate and concomitant rise in sea levels. Many are 
developing countries and small island developing states (SIDS) 
where tourism and fishing are usually key industries; climate 
change, and sea-level rise in particular, may gravely impact such 
areas. Unfortunately, these states also often have the least capacity, 
financing, or support for mitigation and adaptation initiatives.  
Though the extent of sea-level rise and other consequences of 
climate change are uncertain, global sea level rose 16 centimeters 
(cm) in the twentieth century, and the rate of rise is rapidly 
accelerating.1 In its 2007 report, the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) predicted sea levels to rise between 18 cm 
to 59 cm in the next century.2 For many states, infrastructure and 
settlements built along coasts will become uninhabitable or even 
vanish, and a few nations face the real possibility of disappearance 
beyond the next century mark.3 Developing countries are expected 
to suffer the earliest and to the greatest degree because of their 
geographical location, low incomes, weak institutional capacities, 
and greater reliance on climate-sensitive sectors like agriculture.4 
                                                                                                             
 1. John A. Church & Neil J. White, A 20th Century Acceleration in Global 
Sea-Level Rise, 33 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS 1, 2 (2006), available at http:// 
naturescapebroward.com/NaturalResources/ClimateChange/Documents/GRL_Ch
urch_White_2006_024826.pdf.  
 2. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 
2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT 45 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/ 
assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf.  
 3. Susmita Dasgupta, Benoit Laplante, Craig Meisner, David Wheeler & 
Jianping Yan, The Impact of Sea Level Rise on Developing Countries: A 
Comparative Analysis, WORLD BANK, 1, 9–10 (Feb. 2007), http://www-wds. 
worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2007/02/09/00001
6406_20070209161430/Rendered/PDF/wps4136.pdf. A one-meter sea-level rise 
would affect approximately 0.3% of the territory of developing countries and 
approximately 56 million people, or 1.28% of the world population. Eighty-nine 
million people, or 2.03% of the population, would be impacted by a two-meter 
sea-level rise. Thus, these small increases in sea-level rise affect a significant 
population. Such changes not only have social and economic impacts, but also 
possibly security implications. See G.A. Res. 63/281, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/281 
(2009); U.N. GAOR, 63rd Sess., 85th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.85 (June 
3, 2009); Press Release, General Assembly, Expressing Deep Concern, Invites 
Major United Nations Organs to Intensify Efforts in Addressing Security 
Implications of Climate Change, U.N. Press Release GA/10830 (June 3, 2009). 
 4. William Burns, Potential Implications of Climate Change for the 
Coastal Resources of Pacific Island Developing Countries and Potential Legal 
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The threat to these areas from sea-level rise is often compounded 
by other changing climate patterns, leading to coastal wetlands 
losses, groundwater salinization, loss of arable land, and increased 
storm activity. For the SIDS, even slight sea-level rise could be 
dangerous to the health of their economies, people, and 
environments. SIDS especially have a variety of factors that 
aggravate their inability to cope with the effects of rising sea levels 
and climate change. These factors include their limited physical 
size and natural resources; their often fragile economies and social 
and institutional structures; and their susceptibility to natural 
hazards, such as tsunamis and storms.5 
Among other concerns for low-lying coastal states is the 
question of changing territorial boundaries caused by sea-level rise 
and the possible impact this will have on the cultures and 
economies of affected coastal nations. The United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS or the Convention)6 
is the touchstone for establishing states’ rights to maritime zones, 
from inland waters to the deep ocean. Most of the world’s nations 
are parties to the Convention, and it is binding upon them. In 
addition, most of its provisions are regarded as customary 
international law and are therefore binding on all states, even 
nonparties. The maritime zones provided in the Convention extend 
specific distances from the coastal baseline established by each 
state, usually at mean low water marks, and encompass varying 
rights and duties. The economies of SIDS are often heavily 
dependent upon coastal resources. Thus, delimiting a country’s 
various maritime boundaries, especially the territorial sea and 
exclusive economic zone, is particularly important. 
Under UNCLOS, a state’s territorial sea extends 12 nautical 
miles from the coastal baseline and is, as the name suggests, 
essentially sovereign territory.7 Beyond the territorial sea, an 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) extends an additional 188 nautical 
                                                                                                             
 
and Policy Responses, 8 HARV. ASIA–PAC. REV. 4, 7 (2006), available at http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=930449. 
 5. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 
2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATIONS AND VULNERABILITY 692–93 (M.L. Parry et al. 
eds., 2007) [hereinafter IPCC CHAPTER 16], available at http://www.ipcc.ch/ 
pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-chapter16.pdf. 
 6. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS], available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/ 
Publication/UNTS/Volume%201833/volume-1833-A-31363-English.pdf. 
 7. Id. art. 3, at 400. Ships of other states, however, enjoy the right of 
innocent passage. Id. art. 17, at 404. 
154 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73 
 
 
 
miles, ending 200 nautical miles from the baseline.8 Within its 
EEZ, a state may “explor[e,] exploit[], conserv[e,] and manag[e] 
the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters 
superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil.”9 The 
coastal state also has jurisdiction over its continental shelf 
“throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the 
outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 
nautical miles from the baselines.”10 A state may claim an 
extended continental shelf if it can demonstrate actual extension 
beyond 200 miles. Like the EEZ, states may exploit the natural 
resources of the continental shelf.11 Finally, the high seas are areas 
beyond national jurisdiction, constituting “all parts of the sea that 
are not included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial 
sea or in the internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic waters 
of an archipelagic State.”12 With sea-level rise, the coastal 
baselines from which maritime zones are measured will change. 
While the change might be slight in most cases, for some states it 
could be quite consequential. 
This Article first examines the physical, cultural, and economic 
backgrounds of four vulnerable states—Tuvalu, Seychelles, 
Maldives, and Bangladesh—and discusses the extent to which each 
might be affected by sea-level rise. It then considers, in turn, the 
legal implications of the current rules on maritime delimitation 
under UNCLOS for the states, along with their efforts to adapt to 
sea-level rise.  
II. FOUR VULNERABLE STATES 
The four countries included in this review represent a cross-
section of geographic areas, natural resources, and economic 
situations. The potential problems they face from sea-level rise and 
climate change are also representative of many coastal countries 
and small island states. 
 
                                                                                                             
 8. Id. art. 57, at 419. The Convention also provides for a contiguous zone 
beyond the territorial sea, extending from 12 to 24 miles from the baseline, in 
which the coastal state has limited authority over customs, fiscal, immigration, 
and sanitary matters. Id. art. 33, at 409.  
 9. Id. art. 56, at 418. Conservation of the living resources includes determining 
allowable catches of those resources within the EEZ. Id. art. 61(1), at 420. 
 10. Id. art. 76, at 428. The continental shelf “comprises the sea-bed and 
subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea.” Id. 
 11. Id. art. 77(1), at 429. 
 12. Id. art. 86, at 432. 
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A. Tuvalu 
Tuvalu is a Pacific archipelago of nine coral islands with a total 
land area of 26.5 square kilometers.13 It is considered by the U.N. 
to be one of the world’s least developed countries; in 2010 its per 
capita GDP was approximately $3,400, and the state’s aggregate 
GDP was $36 million.14 Tuvalu is a party to UNCLOS;15 however, 
it lacks both the human and financial capacity to formally delineate 
its EEZ pursuant to UNCLOS.16 This results in significant 
uncertainty about the size of its EEZ, with estimates ranging from 
900,000 to 1.3 million square kilometers.17 “Tuvalu is one of the 
most vulnerable countries in the world to sea-level rise,” with an 
average elevation of only one meter above sea level.18 Indeed, 
Tuvalu’s highest elevation is only 5 meters and at its widest point 
only 200 meters.19 Increased storm activity, sea-level rise, and 
intensive land use have made Tuvalu extremely susceptible to 
coastal erosion and, thus, to loss of territory.20 Coral reefs provide 
Tuvalu with significant protection against coastal erosion and also 
                                                                                                             
 13. See generally A.J. TILLING & E. FIHAKI, TUVALU NAT’L BIODIVERSITY 
STRATEGY & ACTION PLAN, FOURTH NATIONAL REPORT TO THE CONVENTION ON 
BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 7 (2009), available at http://www.sprep.org/att/IRC/ 
eCOPIES/Countries/Tuvalu/55.pdf; TE MAILE CONSULTANCY FOR THE ECON. & 
SOCIAL COMM’N FOR ASIA & THE PAC., ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
THE BARBADOS PROGRAMME OF ACTIONS FOR SMALL ISLANDS DEVELOPING 
STATES, AND THE MAURITIUS STRATEGY FOR THE FURTHER IMPLEMENTATION OF 
THE BPOA 7 (2010) [hereinafter TE MAILE], available at http://www.sidsnet.org/ 
msi_5/docs/nars/Pacific/Tuvalu-MSI-NAR2010.pdf; Joeli Veitayaki, Pio Manoa 
& Alan Resture, Addressing Climate Change and Sea Level Rise in the Pacific 
Islands, 47 KAGOSHIMA U. RES. CENTER FOR PAC. ISLANDS OCCASIONAL PAPERS 
1, 16 (2007), available at http://www.spc.int/lrd/index.php?option=com_docman 
&task=doc_download&gid=1145&Itemid=48; MINISTRY OF NATURAL RES., 
ENV’T, AGRIC., & LANDS, DEP’T OF ENV’T, TUVALU’S NATIONAL ADAPTATION 
PROGRAMME OF ACTION 32 (2007) [hereinafter TUVALU MINISTRY], available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/napa/tuv01.pdf. 
 14. Tuvalu (03/01/11), U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Mar. 1, 2011), http://www.state. 
gov/outofdate/bgn/tuvalu/176715.htm; Least Developed Countries: About LDCs, 
UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE LEAST 
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, LANDLOCKED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE SMALL 
ISLAND DEVELOPING STATES (UN-OHRLLS), http://www.unohrlls.org/en/ldc/25/ 
(last visited Oct. 9, 2012). See also Cent. Intelligence Agency, Tuvalu, THE 
WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ 
geos/tv.html (last updated Sept. 11, 2012). 
 15. TE MAILE, supra note 13, at 30. 
 16. Id. at 8. 
 17. TILLING & FIHAKI, supra note 13, at 8; Veitayaki, supra note 13, at 16. 
 18. TILLING & FIHAKI, supra note 13, at 7–8; TE MAILE, supra note 13, at 7. 
 19. TILLING & FIHAKI, supra note 13, at 7–8; TUVALU MINISTRY, supra 
note 13, at 32. 
 20. TUVALU MINISTRY, supra note 13, at 30–31. 
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help to build the islands.21 However, because Tuvalu’s average 
temperatures are within the upper limits for most coral species, 
further temperature increases are likely to result in significant coral 
mortality.22 Therefore, the effects of sea-level rise, coastal erosion, 
and coral damage will likely result in significant land loss for 
Tuvalu, potentially shrinking its EEZ. 
Fishing is a way of life in Tuvalu. Of all Tuvaluan households, 
67% of them were engaged in fishing activities in 2002,23 
contributing $1.6 million, or 8%, of Tuvalu’s GDP.24 Fishing 
provides the primary source of protein for the Tuvaluans who 
consume approximately 100 kilograms of fish per person each year.25  
Foreign fleets also fish Tuvaluan waters, bringing welcome 
revenue to the state. The foreign catch in 2007 was about 35,551 
tons of fish, valued at $40,924,370,26 and the sale of foreign fishing 
licenses alone resulted in approximately $355 of Tuvalu’s per capita 
income.27 Even though Tuvalu attains significant revenue from the 
sale of offshore fishing licenses, its extensive EEZ and severe lack 
of enforcement capacity have resulted in widespread illegal and 
unreported fishing28 and have made it difficult to manage the ten 
conservation areas it established on eight of its islands.29 
B. Seychelles 
Seychelles is an archipelago in the Indian Ocean consisting of 
approximately 115 islands and an aggregate land area of 455 
square kilometers30 and an EEZ of approximately 1.3 million 
                                                                                                             
 21. Id. at 30. 
 22. Id. at 29. 
 23. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, NATIONAL FISHERY 
SECTOR OVERVIEW: TUVALU 10 (2010) [hereinafter FAO TUVALU], available at 
ftp://ftp.fao.org/FI/DOCUMENT/fcp/en/FI_CP_TV.pdf.  
 24. Id. at 1. 
 25. Veitayaki, supra note 13, at 8; TILLING & FIHAKI, supra note 13, at 9; 
Fishery Country Profile: Tuvalu, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
(Apr. 2002), http://www.fao.org/fi/oldsite/FCP/en/TUV/profile.htm. 
 26. FAO TUVALU, supra note 23, at 2. 
 27. ROBERT GILLETT, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 
MARINE FISHERY RESOURCES OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS 44 (2010), available at 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/012/i1452e/i1452e00.pdf. 
 28. See TILLING & FIHAKI, supra note 13, at 9–10. 
 29. TILLING & FIHAKI, supra note 13, at 10, 15. 
 30. MINISTRY OF ENV’T & TRANSP., REPUBLIC OF SEYCHELLES, INITIAL 
NATIONAL COMMUNICATION UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK 
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE 1 (2000) [hereinafter SEYCHELLES MINISTRY], 
available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/seync1.pdf; Seychelles, MANGROVES 
FOR THE FUTURE, http://www.mangrovesforthefuture.org/countries/members/ 
seychelles/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2012) [hereinafter SEYCHELLES MANGROVES]; 
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square kilometers.31 Due to its low-lying elevation and significant 
coastal development, the country is very susceptible to land loss as 
a result of sea-level rise. It is estimated that a one-meter increase in 
sea levels would submerge many of Seychelles’ islands, resulting 
in a loss of 70% of its land area.32 This is especially alarming 
because approximately 85% of the Seychelles’ development occurs 
along its coasts.33 Seychelles’ President captured the urgency of 
the threat of rising waters in his statement to the 2007 Global 
Island Partnership meeting in Rome; he noted that much of the 
country’s coastlines have suffered losses in recent years, with some 
areas losing over 50 meters of coastal plateau.34 
Seychelles’ coral and mangrove ecosystems have been put at 
significant risk by the effects of climate change and development. 
These ecosystems provide Seychelles with natural protections 
against sea-level rise, offering strong protection against erosion and 
serving as both a breeding ground and a habitat for fish.35 Elevated 
sea temperatures near Seychelles have recently caused up to 95% 
mortality in some coral reefs, and further warming is likely to cause 
mass coral bleaching.36 Dense coastal development will lead to the 
loss of mangrove forests because it impedes the mangrove forests’ 
ability to naturally retreat shoreward as the sea level rises.37 
Seychelles is home to over a thousand endemic flora and fauna, 
and the government has made significant commitments to 
protecting its unique biodiversity and ecosystems, setting aside 
46% of its land and an additional 226 square kilometers of ocean 
as national parks and reserves.38 The Vallée de Mai Nature 
                                                                                                             
 
MICHÈLE P. MARTIN, NATIONAL ASSESSMENT REPORT: REPUBLIC OF SEYCHELLES 
(2004–2009) 4-5 (2010), available at http://www.sidsnet.org/msi_5/docs/nars/ 
AIMS/Seychelles-MSI-NAR2010.pdf. See also Cent. Intelligence Agency, 
Seychelles, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/se.html (last updated Sept. 24, 2012); Seychelles (01/20/12), 
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Jan. 1, 2012), http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/seychelles/ 
194938.htm.  
 31. SEYCHELLES MANGROVES, supra note 30; MARTIN, supra note 30, at 5. 
 32. United Nations Env’t Programme, Coastal Erosion and Climate Change 
in the Western Indian Ocean Islands, AFRICA ENV’T OUTLOOK, http://www. 
unep.org/dewa/Africa/publications/aeo-1/110.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2012). 
 33. SEYCHELLES MINISTRY, supra note 30, at 9. 
 34. Sea Level Rise Foundation, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC 
OF SEYCHELLES, http://www.statehouse.gov.sc/index.php?option=com_content 
&view=article&id=85&Itemid=75 (last visited Sept. 30, 2012). 
 35. Id.; SEYCHELLES MINISTRY, supra note 30, at 82. 
 36. SEYCHELLES MINISTRY, supra note 30, at 97; Sea Level Rise Foundation, 
supra note 34. 
 37. SEYCHELLES MINISTRY, supra note 30, at 82. 
 38. Id. at 2. 
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Reserve has been designated as a UNESCO world heritage site,39 
and comprehensive sea turtle protection has been implemented 
through a 1994 law.40 Seychelles has engaged local stakeholders in 
these conservation efforts through stakeholder reports on 
conservation, habitat management, and even rehabilitation 
efforts.41 To address shortcomings in monitoring capacity, 
Seychelles has established a “Greenline,” which allows citizens to 
report illegal activity to the applicable conservation agency.42 
Seychelles’ economy is primarily driven by tourism and fishing, 
which contribute over 40% of its GNP.43 In 1996, tourism brought 
in over $100 million to the Seychelles, about 17% of its GNP, and 
employed 18% of its workforce.44 Fishing provides approximately 
4% of the Seychelles GDP, and in 1996, licensing fees alone 
brought in more than $7 million.45 The artisanal fishing industry 
produces about 4,500 tons of fish for domestic consumption and 
approximately 370 tons, worth over $2 million, in exports.46 As with 
Tuvalu, fishing is a way of life in the Seychelles and is one of the 
most important local sources of protein.47 
C. Maldives 
Maldives is an archipelago of coral atolls consisting of 1,192 
islands in the Indian Ocean with a land area of about 300 square 
                                                                                                             
 39. Id. at 2. 
 40. See generally Jeanne A. Mortimer, John Collie & Charles Mbindo, The 
Status of Sea Turtle Conservation in the Republic of Seychelles, 165 UNEP 
REGIONAL SEAS REP. & STUD. 103 (1996), available at http://college.holycross. 
edu/faculty/kprestwi/chelonia/pubs/4_symposium/Mortimer_Collie_Mbindo.pdf. 
 41. MARINE CONSERVATION SOC’Y SEYCHELLES, STAKEHOLDERS’ STRATEGY 
& ACTION PLAN FOR TURTLE CONSERVATION IN SEYCHELLES 4, 6 (2004) (on file 
with the Louisiana Law Review). 
 42. Greenline Helps Public Protect Environment, SEYCHELLES NATION, 
Nov. 4, 2011, http://www.nation.sc/index.php?art=23093. 
 43. SEYCHELLES MANGROVES, supra note 30.  
 44. SEYCHELLES MINISTRY, supra note 30, at 26. 
 45. Ian Kawaley, Implications of the Exclusive Economic Zone and EEZ 
Management for Seychelles, a Small Midocean Commonwealth Territory, 29 
OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 225, 235 (1998); SEYCHELLES MINISTRY, supra note 
31, at 96. 
 46. SEYCHELLES MINISTRY, supra note 30, at 96. In fact in 2008, the Seychelles 
supplied about 2.4% of the world’s tuna production. See MAKATO PETER MIYAKE, 
PATRICE GUILLOTREAU, CHIN-HWA SUN & GAKUSHI ISHIMURA, FOOD & AGRIC. 
ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE TUNA INDUSTRY: 
STOCKS, FISHERIES, MANAGEMENT, PROCESSING, TRADE AND MARKETS 96 (2010), 
available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/013/i1705e/i1705e.pdf. 
 47. Kawaley, supra note 45, at 234. 
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kilometers,48 sustained through continuous coral formation.49 Its 
EEZ covers more than 859,000 square kilometers.50 Maldives has 
made a firm commitment to address the effects of climate change 
and was the first country to sign the Kyoto Protocol, calling for 
greenhouse gas reductions.51 It has played an active role in calling 
attention to the plight of SIDS and has been instrumental in the 
Alliance of Small Island States’ (AOSIS) push for climate change 
action. 
With over 80% of its land area less than one meter above sea 
level and its highest elevation no more than three meters, Maldives 
is another of the nations most vulnerable to sea-level rise.52 Due to 
significant beach erosion and its low-lying elevation, some studies 
have estimated that with a one-meter rise in sea level, Maldives may 
cease to exist.53 Even if the physical impact is not that severe, other 
studies have predicted that sea-level rise could cause Maldives’ 
GDP to drop by almost 40% due to its impact on fishing and 
tourism.54  
Fishing has been a way of life and a main occupation in 
Maldives for centuries.55 It plays a significant role in the economy 
of the Maldives and accounts for about 6% of the national GDP.56 
The Maldives’ fishing sector employs about 11% of the workforce 
and accounts for about 98% of its physical exports.57 About 80% of 
the Maldives’ fishery sector consists of skipjack and yellowfin tuna 
fishing.58 Tuna provides the primary source of protein in the 
                                                                                                             
 48. MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS, HOUS. & ENV’T, REPUBLIC OF MALDIVES, 
FIRST NATIONAL COMMUNICATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF MALDIVES TO THE 
UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE 2 (2001) 
[hereinafter MALDIVES MINISTRY], available at http://unfccc.int/resource/ 
docs/natc/maldnc1.pdf. See also Cent. Intelligence Agency, Maldives, THE 
WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ 
geos/mv.html (last updated Sept. 20, 2012); Background Note: Maldives, U.S. 
DEP’T OF STATE (Mar. 29, 2012), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/ 5476.htm. 
 49. MALDIVES MINISTRY, supra note 48, at 16. 
 50. Id. at 12.  
 51. Id. at 35. 
 52. Id. at 5, 16. 
 53. Id. at 5. 
 54. IPCC CHAPTER 16, supra note 5, at 709. 
 55. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, NATIONAL FISHERY 
SECTOR OVERVIEW: MALDIVES 5 (2009) [hereinafter FAO MALDIVES], 
available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/FI/DOCUMENT/fcp/en/FI_CP_MV.pdf. Maldivian 
fishermen traditionally build their own boats, and income is distributed equally 
among the crew, while an extra share is allocated to the master fisherman, the 
ship owner, and for vessel maintenance. Id. 
 56. Id. at 2.  
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
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Maldives, and the per capita consumption is about 137 kilograms 
per year.59 
Although enforcement resources are slim, foreign fleets fishing 
within the Maldives’ EEZ are monitored with a vessel monitoring 
system, and there have been several cases involving the coast 
guard’s apprehension of unlicensed vessels.60 To further enforce 
their licensing regime, the Maldives has contracted with GeoEye to 
build a new vessel monitoring system that will track vessels with 
GPS signals and help keep track of fish-catch reports.61  
Tourism makes up another sizable portion of the Maldives’ GDP: 
33%.62 Climate change is expected to lead to significant decreases in 
tourism income for the state due to factors such as loss of beaches and 
degradation of dive sites resulting from coral bleaching.63 
D. Bangladesh 
Bangladesh is a low-lying coastal Asian state located along the 
Bay of Bengal with a land area of about 144,054 square kilometers64 
and a population of approximately 131 million people.65 It is listed 
by the UN as one of the world’s least developed countries with a per 
capita GDP of only $351.66 Sadly, 36% of its population lives on a 
dollar per day or less.67  
                                                                                                             
 59. FIN. & PRIVATE SECTOR DEV. UNIT, S. ASIA REGION, THE WORLD 
BANK, THE MALDIVES: SUSTAINING GROWTH & IMPROVING THE INVESTMENT 
CLIMATE 65–66 (2006), available at http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/pub/ 
2006/ICA_MaldivesREPORT.pdf. 
 60. FAO MALDIVES, supra note 55, at 5. 
 61. GeoEye Wins Contract to Build Vessel Monitoring System for Republic of 
Maldives, PR NEWSWIRE (Jan. 6, 2011), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-
releases/geoeye-wins-contract-to-build-vessel-monitoring-system-for-republic-of-
maldives-113023184.html. 
 62. MALDIVES MINISTRY, supra note 48, at 30. 
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Because about 80% of Bangladesh consists of coastal flood 
plains, sea-level rise could have potentially devastating 
consequences.68 Approximately 35.1 million people live in the 
coastal zone, over half of whom are considered “absolute poor.”69 
The World Bank estimates that there will be a one-meter rise in sea 
level by 2100, which will cause Bangladesh to lose over 17% of its 
territory.70 
Although Bangladesh has only recently opened its deep water 
areas in the Bay of Bengal to energy exploration, there may be vast 
natural gas fields, as there are in surrounding areas controlled by 
India and Myanmar.71 The average estimate of undiscovered 
offshore natural gas controlled by Bangladesh is 18.1 trillion cubic 
feet,72 worth over $52 billion.73 For a country as poor as 
Bangladesh, royalties from these potential deposits could have a 
tremendous impact.  
Bangladesh contains about 60% of the Sundarbans, an 
extensive mangrove forest of approximately 407,313 hectares.74 
The Sundarbans is a UNESCO World Heritage site and the largest 
remaining tract of habitat for the last few hundred wild Bengal 
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tigers.75 According to the IPCC, a one-meter increase in sea level 
will likely cause the demise of this fragile ecosystem.76 The 
Sundarbans serves as protection against coastal erosion, so its loss 
would likely lead to greater land loss.77 
As a result of climate change and rising sea levels, many 
vulnerable coastal and island nations may suffer severe physical, 
economic, and cultural impacts. Those impacts may be exacerbated 
by the loss of territory due to shifting maritime boundaries.  
III. SHIFTING MARITIME ZONES 
A. The Effect of UNCLOS 
With sea-level rise, the baselines from which most maritime 
zones are measured will change. As a consequence, the outer 
boundary of the zone may also change, retreating landward. While 
the change might be slight in most cases, in others it could be quite 
consequential, as, for example, if a baseline point such as an 
exposed rock disappears.78 Excepted from this general rule are the 
boundaries of a state’s continental shelf because the coastal state 
must “deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
charts and relevant information, including geodetic data, 
permanently describing the outer limits of its continental shelf.”79 
UNCLOS also appears to fix the baselines of deltas and areas where 
natural conditions cause the coastline to be highly unstable. Article 7 
of UNCLOS provides that when “a coastline is highly unstable . . . 
notwithstanding subsequent regression of the low-water line, the 
straight baselines shall remain effective until changed by the coastal 
State in accordance with this Convention.”80 
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B. Judicial Decisions Regarding Boundaries 
In some nations, such as the United States, maritime 
boundaries are treated as ambulatory, and thus, when sea level 
rises over time, the boundaries will change. In United States. v. 
Alaska, the Supreme Court recognized the possibility of 
ambulatory boundaries, but courts in other nations may rule 
differently.81 Although international tribunals like the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) have yet to decide cases involving sea-level 
rise and claims of ambulatory baselines, the ICJ has given several 
principles to guide the establishment of maritime boundaries. In 
Cameroon v. Nigeria, the ICJ relied upon an equidistance 
principle, first drawing an equidistant line based on the countries’ 
geography, and then evaluating other factors to determine whether 
the line should be shifted to achieve an equitable result.82 Some of 
the relevant circumstances recognized by the ICJ and other 
international tribunals include: the general configuration of the 
coasts of the parties; general geomorphological, geological, and 
geographical factors; the incidence of natural resources (usually oil 
and natural gas) in the disputed area and the principle of equitable 
access to these resources; defense and security interests of the 
states that are party to the dispute; and consistency with the general 
direction of the land boundary.83 
The effects of shifting baselines could lead to litigation in the 
ICJ and other tribunals as delineation of maritime boundaries is 
difficult and disputes contentious. For instance, disputes between 
Bangladesh and its neighbors, Myanmar and India, over oil and gas 
deposits in the Bay of Bengal led to confrontations between 
Bangladeshi and Myanmar warships. In 2009, Bangladesh 
submitted separate boundary disputes in the Bay of Bengal against 
Myanmar and India to UNCLOS arbitration.84 The controversy 
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between Bangladesh and Myanmar was subsequently submitted to 
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, which 
promulgated a boundary for the continental shelves of Bangladesh 
and Myanmar.85 While litigation is one route that states may take 
to delimit maritime boundaries, there are less confrontational 
alternatives, such as dispute resolution under UNCLOS. Whatever 
the forum chosen, clearly delineated boundaries should lessen 
disputes. 
C. The Impact of Shifting Boundaries on Fisheries 
If a coastal state’s baseline, and concomitantly its maritime 
zones, were to shift significantly landward, the change could have 
adverse consequences for the state’s efforts to manage coastal 
waters and exploit its resources. If the shift were substantial 
enough, large segments of waters formerly under the jurisdiction of 
the state might be beyond its EEZ and, thus, form part of the high 
seas, open to all. These areas beyond national jurisdiction may be 
subject to some provisions of UNCLOS86 or other international 
agreements, but protections are limited.  
Pursuant to UNCLOS articles 118 and 119(2), in dealing with 
the high seas, states must make scientific information, catch-and-
fishing-effort statistics, and any additional data relevant to the 
conservation of fish stocks available to international 
organizations.87 To implement these provisions, states are required 
to keep a “national record of fishing vessels authorized to fish on 
the high seas and provision of access to information contained in 
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that record on requires by directly interested states.”88 If enforced, 
these articles can help ensure not only that relevant information is 
gathered and transmitted, but also that transparency in the process 
is maintained, which is a precursor to effective international 
conservation efforts. Unfortunately, it can be difficult for states to 
track and monitor all of their flagged fishing vessels, even in their 
own waters, and states may have little incentive to ensure that their 
vessels do not misreport their catches, especially in distant waters. 
Additionally, transparency is required only as to other states, and 
there are no requirements to release this information to the public, 
which limits oversight.89 
Even though UNCLOS provides a framework for establishing 
sustainable yields for high seas fisheries, issues arise when it 
comes to actually enforcing allowable catches and promoting 
conservation efforts. Article 119(1) of UNCLOS requires that 
states determine allowable catches based on the best scientific 
evidence to maintain “populations of harvested species at levels 
which can produce the maximum sustainable yield as qualified by 
relevant environmental and economic factors.”90 These catch 
requirements are often difficult to enforce, and as noted, states 
have little incentive to police distant high seas.  
A well-known example of the problem of overfishing in 
international waters is the Chilean Sea Bass, or Patagonian 
Toothfish. Currently described as “seriously overfished,”91 the 
Chilean Sea Bass is regulated by the Commission for the 
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, created 
pursuant to Article IX of the Antarctic treaty system.92 In 2000 it 
was estimated that illegal harvesting of the Chilean Sea Bass 
amounted to twice the 16,000 tons that were legally harvested in 
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the Antarctic management area.93 Although a shift of boundaries 
may not always result in greater threats to fisheries and other living 
resources than if they were in a state’s EEZ, the possibility 
remains.94  
IV. WHERE IS THE FAIRNESS? 
Significant fairness concerns arise in conjunction with 
boundary delineations, and equity traditionally plays a role in the 
delineation process. The ICJ has recognized the importance of 
delineations to the livelihood and economic well-being of the 
parties to a delineation dispute. We should consider, then, the 
equitable issues involved when addressing the current regime of 
ambulatory baselines for territorial seas and EEZs. Most of the 
countries that stand to lose substantial amounts of territory if 
boundaries are modified due to sea-level rise are SIDS and other 
developing coastal countries. They contribute little to the global 
threat and have little capacity for mitigation and adaptation, yet 
they will bear a disproportionate share of the burden. This 
imbalance in power and capacity to mitigate and adapt to climate 
change starkly demonstrates the gulf between developed and 
developing states.95 
None of the four countries profiled in this Article has any 
substantial capacity to mitigate the effects of climate change, as 
they each contribute such a small percentage of global greenhouse 
gas emissions. In 1994, Tuvalu emitted .61 tons of carbon dioxide 
(CO2) per capita, compared to 22.2 tons in the United States.96 
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Because 90% of the Seychelles territory is covered with 
vegetation, it sequesters about 4.4 times the amount that it emits.97 
In 2007 the Maldives was responsible for just .003% of the world’s 
CO2 emissions, and its per capita CO2 emissions were just under 
three tons, while the world average was over five tons.98 
Nevertheless, the Maldives take its own responsibilities seriously, 
and to fulfill them while setting an example for the rest of the 
world, it has resolved to achieve carbon neutrality within a 
decade.99 In 2007, Bangladesh, with a population estimated to 
exceed 150 million, the seventh largest in the world, was 
responsible for less than 15% of the world’s CO2 emissions, and its 
per capita emissions were only one-twentieth of the average global 
per capita CO2 emissions.100 So, in spite of the Maldives’ brave 
attempt to reduce its emissions, these countries have no meaningful 
capacity to mitigate the effects of climate change. 
Many developing states will face devastating economic 
impacts as a result of climate change.101 The current regime of 
ambulatory baselines threatens to deplete some of the most 
valuable resources that each of these countries possesses, making it 
even more difficult for these countries to build resilience to sea-
level rise. Shrinking EEZs will result in lower revenues from the 
fishing industries of Tuvalu, Seychelles, and Maldives. Countries 
such as Bangladesh may be unable to produce sufficient revenue 
from their significant nonliving resources to fund the necessary 
adaptation infrastructure.  
If the current ambulatory baselines regime is maintained, not 
only will many of the smallest contributors to climate change lose 
control over portions of their most valuable natural resources, but 
many of the largest contributors to climate change will also be 
positioned to reap the benefits of these resources as they become 
part of the “high seas.” In 1999, a vast majority of the ships 
licensed to fish in Tuvaluan waters were from the U.S. and 
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Japan.102 In 2008, only six countries were licensed to fish in 
Tuvaluan waters, a list that included Japan, Spain, and the U.S.103 
Japan and the U.S. ranked as the second and fifth largest current 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emitters in 2007 and have been the source 
of a substantial portion of the world’s historical emissions of 
GHGs.104 The current regime of ambulatory baselines creates a 
perverse system in which countries that are responsible for most of 
the world’s GHG emissions may benefit at the cost of countries 
that are some of the world’s lowest emitters of GHGs.  
Some of these developing states most vulnerable to climate 
change have been proactive in protecting their ecological diversity, 
but the loss of territory may prevent these countries from 
effectively implementing their conservation efforts. Tuvalu has 
engaged in conservation efforts as stated above; however, limited 
enforcement resources have made effective implementation a 
challenge. Shrinking EEZs will reduce revenues, and already 
limited enforcement efforts will become even more scant. 
Seychelles’ efforts to preserve almost 50% of its land territory and 
226 square kilometers of ocean as natural areas to protect the flora 
and fauna endemic to the islands will face increasing pressure as 
climate costs increase and revenues shrink.105 This pressure on 
protected areas will further increase as coastal settlement is forced 
to retreat from rising sea levels. Therefore, it seems that countries 
that have made commitments to conservation, such as Tuvalu and 
Seychelles, may be stymied by loss of territory and shrinking 
revenues.  
The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development sets 
forth principles to guide nations as they pursue the goal of 
sustainable development. Principle Two provides that countries 
have the right to exploit their own resources, but they must do so in 
a fashion that does not interfere with other countries’ rights to a 
healthy environment.106 The leading GHG-emitting countries are 
exploiting their resources in a manner that causes damage to the 
environment and the areas beyond their national jurisdictions, in 
contradiction of Principle Two. In addition, the current regime of 
ambulatory baselines threatens to deprive coastal states vulnerable 
to sea-level rise, like those profiled above, of some of their 
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principle sources of revenue. This will impede the ability of these 
countries to adapt to the effects of sea-level rise, much less pursue 
national development. Further, the loss of historical fishing 
grounds for many of these countries—the result of a climate 
changing process caused by GHG emissions from far more 
developed countries—is at odds with the concept that a right to 
develop should not compromise the developmental and 
environmental needs of present and future generations. For these 
reasons, the current regime for boundary specification may 
inequitably burden the most vulnerable states and should therefore 
be reconsidered. 
V. ADAPTATION TO RISING SEAS 
For SIDS and other vulnerable coastal states, the diminishment 
of their EEZs and other maritime zones, if sufficiently severe, 
could pose potentially severe consequences for their economies, 
environments, and the health and welfare of their peoples. SIDS 
are especially vulnerable, so an organized process to assess the 
problems and the development of adaptive strategies are especially 
critical for them. Although mitigation remains a crucial strategy for 
addressing climate change, and SIDS and other coastal states may 
benefit from their own measures to reduce GHG emissions, 
implementing adaptation measures to deal with the effects of rising 
sea level is essential for them. One appropriate way to approach 
adaptation is to take immediate steps to better manage their EEZs 
and other maritime zones.107 
A variety of challenges confront SIDS and other island states in 
implementing adaptation measures. Obviously, the cost to employ 
these measures could be burdensome. For instance, it has been 
suggested that climate change protection initiatives would amount 
to 34% of the Maldives’ GDP.108 In addition, tailoring the 
adaptation measures to the specific problems and local customs of 
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the state remains a challenge, especially if requirements imposed 
by funding sources are not adapted to local conditions. Local 
knowledge may not be reflected in the adaptation measures, which 
devalues the contributions of local citizens who might otherwise 
feel empowered to influence the manner in which their countries 
respond to climate change. Community knowledge is not often 
considered, and according to commentators, “Local strategies for 
dealing with climate change are sometimes dismissed as 
ineffective due to a lack of relevant knowledge from which to 
work, even when they are actually hampered by a lack of 
supportive institutions and financial resources to implement 
adaptation activities.”109 Furthermore, management of these 
adaptation measures is made difficult by the lack of experts 
available and willing to provide aid. Within SIDS, there is a lack of 
qualified scientific knowledge in the fields of marine science, 
oceanography, and coastal management, as well as a lack of 
appropriate equipment to ensure proper management of marine and 
coastal resources.110 Therefore, external aid is necessary not only 
in the form of financial resources, but also human capital. 
Approaches to adaptation come in an array of forms, depending 
on the state’s resources and the issues to be resolved. First, 
engineering solutions may be available to address problems 
associated with sea-level rise. Artificial barriers and sea walls are 
frequently employed to limit beach erosion and protect against sea-
level rise. These can be successful short-term adaptation options 
and can be utilized to protect property at risk to the immediate 
problem of sea-level ingress. However, investment in such options 
is often high because such options involve expensive 
hydrodynamic studies.111 For example, the cost of protecting 50 of 
the 200 inhabited islands of the Maldives with artificial structures 
was estimated to be over $1.5 billion in 1998;112 to protect all 200 
inhabited islands would require roughly $6 billion, or more than 30 
times the country’s GDP.113 Additionally, in many SIDS such as 
Tuvalu, sea walls have not been adequately maintained, and in 
some cases, these structures may have actually contributed to, 
rather than prevented, coastal erosion.114  
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In addition to sea walls, other options include mechanical or 
electronic tide and flood control systems, which are designed to 
address specific coastal characteristics, including the location of 
ports and other infrastructure. While they may sometimes present 
attractive options, costs of construction and maintenance can be 
prohibitive.115 Efforts to maintain and restore so-called soft 
structures like beaches, dunes, and wetlands are frequently 
proposed; however, they are often short term and may ultimately 
succumb to rising waters.116 Bangladesh, which would like to be a 
showcase for adaptation efforts, has included in its strategy ideas 
borrowed from the Dutch: building a network of earthen berms and 
embankments based on polders employed in the Netherlands.117 
The network will be expanded, and the embankments strengthened 
and built higher.118 However, SIDS are unlikely to have the 
resources to implement these sorts of high-cost initiatives. 
Furthermore, as the recent tsunami in Japan demonstrates, even the 
most sophisticated and expensive coastal defenses may be no 
match for Mother Nature. 
Another adaptation option is for states to implement ecological 
solutions. Preservation of natural barriers such as mangroves, coral 
reefs, and sandy beaches is critically important, and the natural 
ability of beaches to act as self-adjusting buffers in the face of 
rising sea levels must be maintained.119 States can also create soft 
structures, which absorb wave energy and engage in tree planting 
for erosion control. For instance, to help reduce erosion, the 
Tuvalu Council of Women, funded by the New Zealand Agency 
for International Development, planted trees across the 
archipelago; their efforts on Niutao, where they planted local 
species, could be utilized as a “green-belt model.”120 The use of 
native plants adapted to local conditions should be promoted as an 
effective and ecologically beneficial means to protect coasts.121  
Some states have banned certain industrial practices in an 
effort to curtail ecological harm. For example, coral mining, which 
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is frequently practiced in the Maldives, was restricted, and a 
complete ban on coral mining was considered.122 Coastal states 
with greater resources have been able to implement more 
expansive initiatives such as coastal afforestration, which is 
estimated to cost Bangladesh $23 million.123  
There are many land-use solutions aimed at more effective 
management of coastal areas. Local tourism for SIDS tends to be 
highly concentrated in coastal areas where activities like fishing, 
snorkeling, and water sports are popular. While tourism is 
undoubtedly a significant contributor to the local economies, it has 
a potentially devastating effect on the environment. For this 
reason, relocating tourist activities and implementing reclamation 
projects can be effective in dealing with sea-level rise and its 
consequences. This solution may provide the best long-term 
security for investments, but the scarcity of coastal land and its 
cost presents a problem.124 Creating educational programs is also 
an option. For instance, Tuvalu has adopted legislation and 
programs aimed at increasing local knowledge of land use and 
coastal planning.125 
Finally, in some instances retreat may mean relocating the 
entire population away from the home territory. Some states refuse 
to consider this option due to cultural and historical ties to the 
geographic area itself. Prime Minister Apisai Ielemia of Tuvalu 
reflected this attitude at U.N. climate negotiations in Poznan, 
Poland (2008) by asserting that “a nation has a right to exist 
forever [and it] is our basic human right.”126 For most states, 
retreat would be a last resort—a route to take should no other 
adaptation mechanism prove successful.  
Despite Tuvalu’s resistance, press reports indicate that the 
Prime Minister held confidential talks with Australian officials in 
October 2008 aimed at obtaining Australia’s agreement to accept 
the entire Tuvaluan population if and when it is forced to 
evacuate.127 In addition, Tuvalu negotiated an agreement with New 
Zealand (under the Pacific Access Category and the Temporary 
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Labor Scheme) for the resettlement of 75 of Tuvaluan citizens to 
New Zealand each year.128  
Other states have openly acknowledged their plans to relocate 
to another territory. Maldives’ then-President announced in 2008 
that the country would “begin to divert a portion of the country’s 
billion-dollar annual tourist revenue to buying a new homeland—
as an insurance policy against climate change that threatens to turn 
the 300,000 islanders into environmental refugees.”129  
VI. CONCLUSION 
There are no easy solutions for states vulnerable to sea-level 
rise and other manifestations of climate change. For low-lying 
coastal and small island states, the situation is especially acute and 
is aggravated by the problem of shifting maritime boundaries. 
Various proposals have been made to deal with the issue but little 
progress made.130 States should make strenuous efforts both to 
delimit their continental shelves and, insofar as possible, to fix 
their current baselines. Because of the substantial expenses 
involved in such endeavors, international programs should assist 
with financial and technical support, both in establishing maritime 
boundaries, as well as in developing licensing and conservation 
laws and building enforcement capacity. Although sea-level rise 
cannot be stopped, those countries most vulnerable to its effects 
can be helped to meet its challenges. 
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